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MANDATORY DEDICATION OF PUBLIC SITES AS A
CONDITION IN THE SUBDIVISION PROCESS IN VIRGINIA
Robert L. Dolbeare*
The growth pressure on the suburban and rural counties in Vir-
ginia in the seventies should be as great as that experienced by
counties in the Boston to Washington corridor in the sixties. This
urban corridor is working its way south.
As suburbs grow, services are needed: schools, fire protection,
police protection, and libraries. New residents mean more traffic,
more noise, more smog and more taxpayer demands. They want
homes with nearby schools and parks, plus public water and sewer
service. Many want single family houses on separate lots, thereby
creating a demand for subdivisions that consume large quantities of
land.' Each suburban area is faced with a number of "Shady Acres"
subdivisions, and each Shady Acres comes with a section one with
so many lots, followed by a section two with more lots-the process
seems endless. Side by side with these pressures, land values have
soared, making property acquisition by the localities for public use
almost prohibitive.
Localities have used various means to avoid these growth pres-
sures. Moratoriums have been declared on rezoning, subdividing
and issuance of building permits. Large lot zoning has been tried
* Partner, Obenshain, Hinnant, Dolbeare & Beale, Richmond, Virginia; B. Mgt. Eng.,
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1958; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1965.
1. Townhouses and condominiums are now making large inroads in Virginia. One reason
is the lack of land in more developed suburban areas.
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and declared invalid. 2 But these and similar no-growth steps ignore
the valid need for suburban homes.
A more sensible alternative is to let growth pay for its services and
needs. Since most developments pass through a subdivision process,
that step is a logical time to review and assess these costs. The costs
can be met by requiring the subdivider to dedicate land for public
facilities, such as schools, parks, and fire stations. If the available
land is not appropriate, because of terrain, location or overall
county needs, cash fees can be substituted for the equivalent land
value.
Such dedication provisions are becoming more common as growth
pressures build.3 They are being considered in Virginia, some coun-
ties having already enacted subdivision ordinances containing dedi-
cation provisions.4
Whether dedication requirements can withstand legal challenge
is a question that developers and their attorneys will raise, and one
2. Large lot zoning has been described as a veiled attempt to exclude people and has been
struck down by the Virginia Supreme Court. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
3. The Washington Environmental Research Center surveyed techniques used by local
governments to cope with environmental problems. The survey disclosed that 47% of respond-
ing counties over 10,000 population and 29% of responding counties over 50,000 population
have requirements for dedication. CARTER, FROST, RuHiN & SumEK, ENviRoNMENTAL MANAGE-
MNT AND LocAL GovmNMENT (1974). The response breakdown shows the "middle" popula-
tion areas have most frequently resorted to dedication requirements:
Cities over 500,000 40%
250,000 to 500,000 44%
100,000 to 250,000 54%
50,000 to 100,000 53%
25,000 to 50,000 45%
10,000 to 25,000 45%
Counties over 500,000 48%
250,000 to 500,000 37%
100,000 to 250,000 68%
50,000 to 100,000 21%
Those states with less land and more people use this device most. In the west 60% of those
responding cities and 52% of those responding counties used dedication. The southern states
used the technique least with only 36% of responding cities and 20% of responding counties
requiring dedication of sites. The study did not analyze what types of sites were required.
4. In addition to personal interviews with state and local planners, the author surveyed
counties in Virginia's Alexandria to Richmond to Norfolk urban corridor plus most of the
other suburban counties. Specific ordinances are discussed in the body of this article.
436
DEDICATION OF PUBLIC SITES
which local government planners and their attorneys must be able
to answer in the affirmative. The answer can be determined only
after analyzing certain subsidiary questions:
1. Is mandatory dedication a "taking" which requires reim-
bursement?
2. Are required cash fees constitutional?
3. Can Virginia localities use this procedure under present en-
abling legislation?
4. What safeguards must localities incorporate into their dedica-
tion procedure?
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY DEDICATION; IS IT A TAKING?
Mandatory dedication must pass two constitutional tests, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and the similar provision in the Virginia Constitution.'
A federal constitutional question of taking could be raised in either
state or federal courts. However, there is a general lack of federal
case law on subdivision ordinances.6 Therefore one must turn to
state court decisions.
Few state courts have reached the question of constitutionality.
Of these, Ayres v. City Council7 is the most influential "subdivi-
sion " case. In Ayres the developer presented a plat for a thirteen-
acre subdivision adjacent to a major cross-city road to which the
city sought to ban all direct access from the lots. The planning com-
mission and the city council required that various conditions be met
before the plat could be recorded. The developer challenged four
of these as onerous: (a) dedication of a ten-foot strip for widening
the cross-city road; (b) restriction of an additional ten-foot strip for
trees and shrubbery to separate the subdivision from the same road;
(c) dedication of a cross street eighty feet wide whereas it was only
sixty feet wide in an adjacent subdivision; and (d) dedication and
5. VA. CONST. art. I, §11.
6. This probably results for two reasons. Most state subdivision enabling legislation pro-
vides for an appeal from adverse governmental decisions to the local state trial court. E.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-475 (Repl. Vol. 1973). In addition, federal courts are likely to abstain
from acting to permit the state court to initially hear such local questions. E.g., Fralin and
Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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elimination of a small median created by the cross-city road, the
eighty-foot street and another street.
The first two items were significant because they related to poten-
tial problems created by the subdivision over and above its own
internal traffic flow, drainage and utilities. All four items would
benefit persons living outside the subdivision by improving traffic
flow on the through streets. The developer contended that no dedi-
cations could be exacted to add to existing streets. The court con-
cluded that the conditions were reasonably related to "local and
neighborhood planning and traffic conditions."8 They rejected as
invalid the developer's objection that the proposed conditions con-
templated future needs. Because the developer was seeking the ben-
efit of subdividing, he had the "duty" to comply with conditions
that contributed to the safety of his potential lot owners "and of the
public."9 This latter emphasis indicated court approval of relating
the subdivision to the needs of the entire community.
The court's emphasis on a "duty" to meet conditions to obtain
the "privilege" of subdividing sparked a vigorous dissent, which
argued for a "right" to subdivide.'" The dissent was concerned about
conditions based on reasonable necessity, pointing out that future
conditions grounded on that argument could include schools, recre-
ational areas or other public purposes." The conclusion drawn by
the dissent is that once the "right to subdivide" shifts to a privilege
of having a subdivision accepted, many conditions can be added
without resulting in a constitutional "taking." The Ayres majority
had cited with approval, and the minority had cited with concern,
an earlier Michigan case which had bluntly stated that a developer
"voluntarily dedicates land for streets in return for the advantage
and privilege of having his plat recorded."' 2
Developers have accepted internal street dedication because lots
will not sell without access. As time has passed utility easements
have likewise been accepted. But when the locality begins to exact
dedication for public needs, such as schools and recreational areas,
8. Id. at , 207 P.2d at 5.
9. Id. at ., 207 P.2d at 7.
10. Id. at -, 207 P.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
12. Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, _, 217 N.W. 58, 59 (1928).
[Vol. 9:435
DEDICATION OF PUBLIC SITES
the developers' resistance has increased. Since Ayres, a number of
state courts have wrestled with constitutional assaults on subdivi-
sion ordinances requiring dedication of public space over and above
that required for internal needs, such as streets. 2-1
Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,13 illustrates
the more restrictive test of such dedications. The Illinois Supreme
Court held any burden to be borne by the developer must be "specif-
ically and uniquely attributable" to the particular subdivision. Spe-
cifically the court was concerned with school costs not caused by the
subdivider but resulting from the total development of the com-
munity. In effect, the court created a situation in which no devel-
oper could be required to contribute to the solution of a problem
unless he alone was responsible for it. This approach is unworkable,
particularly in smaller subdivisions. How would a 30-lot subdivision
provide half of a baseball diamond or a tenth of a fire station?
The more liberal line of cases holds the exaction is not dependent
upon exclusive use of the facilities by those who will occupy the new
subdivision. For example, in Associated Home Builders v. Walnut
Creek," the court upheld a state enabling statute and a city ordi-
nance that required either dedication of land, a payment of fees or
a combination of both for park or recreational purposes. 5 The court,
relying on the Ayres case, rejected the association's contention that
dedications could be justified only if the particular need is attribut-
able to the population increase in the subdivision alone. The Cali-
fornia court specifically rejected the test announced in the Pioneer
Trust case, 6 and found a sufficient nexus between the subdivision
and the dedication because the land or fees would be used to acquire
12.1. A number of state court decisions on mandatory dedication of land or of cash in lieu
of land for recreational facilities are collected at Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Statute or Ordinance Requiring Land Developer to Dedicate Portion of Land for Recreational
Purposes, or Make Payment in Lieu Thereof, 43 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972).
13. 22 IlM. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
14. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878
(1972).
15. The local ordinance required land dedication in accordance with proposed parks lo-
cated on the city's master park and recreational plan.
16. Id. at , 484 P.2d at 613 n.7, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637 n.7. The Pioneer Trust case has
been criticized as creating an unworkable situation in Illinois. Platt & Maloney-Merkle,
Municipal Improvisations: Open Space Exactions in the Land of Pioneer Trust, 5 URBAN
LAw. 706 (1973).
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a park to serve the subdivision and because the location of land or
amount of fees was based on the number of inhabitants in the subdi-
vision.' 7
A similar result was obtained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in Jordan v. Menomonee Falls."8 In Jordan, the ordinance required
dedication of school, park and recreation sites and reservation for
subsequent acquisition of other sites for "facilities necessary to serve
the additional families brought into the community by subdivision
development."' 9 That ordinance also contained an option for cash
payments in lieu of actual land dedication.
The decisions in Walnut Creek and Jordan were appealed to the
United States Supreme Court but both appeals were dismissed "for
want of a substantial question." The United States Supreme Court
found the federal constitutional challenge to dedication of land or
fees for parks and schools without merit."0
The Virginia constitutional provision requiring compensation for
the taking or damaging of property for public uses2' will not prevent
mandatory dedication. Again, the police power is involved. Prior to
the United States Supreme Court decision in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,22 the Virginia Supreme Court sustained zoning ordi-
nances against constitutional attack. 23 The Court has held that the
definition of general welfare and the state's police power to protect
the general welfare changes as new conditions arise, noting: "Gen-
eral welfare in Alexandria today may warrant regulations which
would have been fantastic in Sherwood Forest. '24
17. The city ordinance required two and one-half acres or cash equivalent for each 1000
new residents.
18. 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
19. Id. at __, 137 N.W.2d at 443.
20. It is unfortunate that more definitive United States Supreme Court rulings are not
available, but dismissals in Walnut Creek and Jordan are binding as precedents. See Ohio
ex rel. Eason v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (Brennan, J., mee.); Ahem v. Murphy, 457
F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
44 (1964).
21. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 562, 134 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1926), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
24. West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 288, 192 S.E. 881, 888 (1937).
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The few Virginia Supreme Court decisions touching on subdivi-
sion matters have turned on unrelated problems, but the court has
clearly defined the process in terms of a police power delegated by
the General Assembly to local governing bodies. 5 The court's test
of the use of this power is one of reasonableness, stating what is
reasonable in one locality could be unreasonable in another.26 In
pointing out the difference between zoning and subdividing, the
court stated that the former can prohibit certain uses of property
whereas the latter regulates the manner in which that use takes
place. 7 By zoning ordinances, a locality can prevent subdividing as
to certain lands; subdivision ordinances only allow regulation of the
manner in which the subdivision may develop.
The Virginia Attorney General has approved an ordinance requir-
ing dedication of streets, drainage easements, parks and play-
grounds and the reservation of sites for schools, libraries and other
municipal buildings.Y The reserved sites were to be held by the
developer for up to eighteen months to permit purchase by the
governing body. If they were not purchased, they could be used for
subdivision lots. The opinion mirrored the rationale of Ayres when
it stated the governing body was "merely providing that if he [the
developer] wished to subdivide he must meet these requirements.
[Tihe landowner is not being required to subdivide his property."29
Somewhat later, the Attorney General ruled that mandatory dedi-
cation or reservation of land for parks or school sites was permissi-
ble." The Attorney General's rationale was that subdividers "know-
ingly" create needs for facilities and can be required to provide for
that need."
25. National Realty Corp. v. Virginia Beach, 209 Va. 172, 174, 163 S.E.2d 154, 156 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as National Realty]; Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204
Va. 380, 383, 131 S.E.2d 290, 292 (1963).
26. Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 384, 131 S.E.2d 290, 293
(1963). The case involved the size of lots, the court permitting an exception to the local
ordinance.
27. Id. at 382, 131 S.E.2d at 292.
28. 1966-67 Op. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 272.
29. Id. at 273.
30. 1973-74 Op. VA. ATr'Y GmN. 343.
31. Id. at 343. However, the Attorney General was of the opinion that a minimum require-
ment of four acres per subdivision would be unreasonable and that requiring a subdivider to
provide facilities for needs not caused by his activities could be unreasonable and confisca-
tory.
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Without a precise decision from the Virginia Supreme Court, a
state constitutional attack on mandatory dedication has theoreti-
cally not been foreclosed. However, in view of the court's past rul-
ings and two strong Attorney General opinions, such an attack
would appear to have little chance of success. State governmental
agencies have discussed mandatory dedication in subdivision and
land use studies without any expressed concern or reservation about
constitutional limitations.32 This administrative approval coupled
with the Attorney General's published opinions would be a difficult
combination to overcome. The majority opinion in Ayres has be-
come a cornerstone upon which many state courts have built their
decisions upholding mandatory dedication of land for public pur-
poses.3 It is reasonable to predict the Virginia Supreme Court would
reach a similar conclusion.
Although the concept of mandatory dedication by subdividers
may be constitutionally acceptable, it can still be abused to the
extent that it may be unconstitutional as applied. Each case must
depend on its facts; there must be some relationship between the
dedication sought and the subdivision itself. Whether the Virginia
Supreme Court will accept the more restrictive test of Pioneer Trust
or the more liberal test of Walnut Creek remains to be seen. Under
either test, local governing bodies should be prepared to demon-
strate the fairness of their standard .3 This serves a twofold purpose:
it bolsters the ordinance's defense against a legal attack while it
demonstrates to the developer why, under 1975 conditions, he is
32. E.g., VIRGINIA DISION OF PLANNING ANO ECONoMIc DEVELoPMENT, SUGGESTIONS FOR
REGULATING SUBDIVISIONS (1956). The report proposed requiring dedications of land for streets,
drainage, parks and playgrounds and reservation of land for other public uses. Id. at 21. Their
draft ordinance was similar to the one considered in the 1966 Attorney General opinion, supra
note 28. In 1974 the Virginia Advisory Legislative Council (VALC) submitted its report to
the Governor and to the General Assembly. VmGnIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LAND USE
PoucIEs (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Report].
33. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880
(1970); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966);
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 4 (1966); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone Co., 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
34. In Associated Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972), the court discussed a state legislative
report tying park needs to population growth. In Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608,
137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966), the court pointed out that a
municipality might be able to show that a group of subdivisions over a number of years
created certain demands; the particular municipality showed a relationship between in-
creased numbers of lots, increased overall population and increased school population.
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being asked to dedicate for Shady Acres, section two when he was
not required to do so in 1974 for Shady Acres, section one.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CASH FEES
A problem that arises in mandatory dedication of public spaces
is determining the amount of land needed for the particular purpose
and then allocating it to the subdivision being considered. When
streets or utility easements are needed, the allocation is more direct.
Each lot needs access, frontage and certain utilities. Parklands,
schools or libraries present more complex apportionment. Of these,
parks are easiest, if one accepts the premise that pure open space
meets this need. A small subdivigion need not provide enough space
for a baseball field, but it can provide areas for swings or a bicycle
path. Larger facilities, such as schools, cannot be selected solely by
the local planning commissions on a subdivision by subdivision
basis. Few counties need one school site per subdivision let alone
one library or fire station. Furthermore, the school board may not
desire a school site in the particular subdivision. Location of major
facilities requires balanced views of school boards, utility depart-
ments, road engineers and the local board of supervisors. Some type
of master plan is in order.
There is ample Virginia enabling legislation for such master plan-
ning. The basic device is the comprehensive plan.3 5 Prior to 1975,
this was permissive legislation and the local governing body could
plan in depth or not plan at all. The 1975 General Assembly
amended the legislation to require every locality to adopt a master
plan by July 1, 1980. 5 While the details of the plan are left up to
the localities, the subdivision ordinance is one method of imple-
menting the plan. The comprehensive plan itself does not zone or
prohibit building. It is a long range recommendation for the general
growth of the locality. It may designate proposed transportation
35. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-446 to -457 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
36. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 641, at-. Currently local governments are using this
device; but less than half of the counties have a comprehensive plan. Mizell, Toward a State
Land Use Policy for Virginia, 50 UNIv. VA. NEwstm'r=R 2 (September 15, 1973).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-447 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Other means of implementation suggested
are an official map showing present and proposed public facilities and services, id. §§ 15.1-
458 to -463, a capital improvements program or long range budgeting of proposed public
facilities id. § 15.1-464, and a zoning ordinance, id. §§ 15.1-486 to -498.
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facilities and a system of parks, schools and public buildings. Once
the plan is approved by the local governing body, no public building
may be constructed nor public area acquired unless it has been
approved by the local planning commission as conforming to the
plan. 31 Prior to adopting the plan or amendments to it, the govern-
ing body holds public hearings.39 The master plan or official map,
together with the subdivision review process, can insure that parks
and schools are not sprinkled like salt and pepper, but are meaning-
fully located.4"
The comprehensive plan will alert potential subdividers to pro-
spective public sites. However this can actually result in a degree
of unfair treatment between developers. The developer with the
predesignated area on his tract looks with envy at his competitor
with a tract free of school or library sites. Although location on a
plan is not equivalent to reservation of a site, let alone its acquisi-
tion," the developer can anticipate that the planning commission
will require dedication of the predesignated school site before it
approves the subdivision plat. Both subdivisions produce students,
yet only one yields land.
To remedy this situation and to require each subdivision to carry
its share, a number of states have required cash fees in lieu of land
or a combination of fees and land. This technique can be expected
to appear in Virginia localities.4 2
38. Id. § 15.1-456. Prior to the 1975 legislation, local governing bodies were not required to
even establish planning commissions. Now they must do so by July 1, 1976. Va. Acts of
Assembly 1975, ch. 641, at _. The governing body appoints the commission. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-437 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
39. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-448, -453 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
40. The local planning commission is generally the body that reviews and approves subdi-
vision plats in suburban counties. Id. § 15.1-473.
41. Id. § 15.1-458. The original legislation proposed would have called for a five year
reservation of each site. Zoning, Subdivision Control and Planning in Virginia, H.D. Doc. No.
.7, 1962 General Assembly 24-25. The landowner would not have been able to get a building
permit in such area. These restrictions were not adopted by the General Assembly.
42. A number of counties surveyed by the author were considering such legislation. Han-
over County, a growing suburban county, has provided that a developer "may" dedicate a
monetary amount for use in acquiring open space or recreational areas outside the subdivi-
sion. Hanover County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance 5-8(4). If the funds are not used within
twenty-four months they revert to the developer. No guidelines are included within the
ordinance for deciding between land and fees. The 1974 Virginia Advisory Legislative Council
discussed cash fees and proposed legislation for fees as a prerequisite to subdivision plat
approval. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 60. The legislation died in committee in 1974.
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The requirement of cash in lieu of land has met with mixed results
in other states. Several courts have called this provision a tax be-
cause the funds went into a general revenue fund and their expendi-
ture was not related to the particular subdivision . 3 Although they
struck down cash fee provisions, only the court in Aunt Hack Ridge
Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission44 did so on constitutional
grounds. In Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, the court held land dedica-
tion provisions to be a valid exercise of delegated police power,45 but
found provisions authorizing use of cash fees to acquire park land
for general use by all town residents to be constitutionally defective.
The court held that any money collected must be limited to the
regulated subdivision's direct benefit.4"
A fee provision would permit all subdivisions to carry their fair
share. If dedication of land can be compelled and is labeled a "non-
taking" from a compensation stand point, it is difficult to see how
the payment of the same value in cash becomes a "taking." This
has been the view expressed in those state courts sustaining ordi-
nances with cash fee provisions for park and recreational purposes.47
The New York Court of Appeals said it was difficult to distinguish
between "taxing" land by dedication requirements and "taxing" by
cash.48 The similarity is a logical one from the developer's point of
view because he is primarily interested in profits and profits are
equally reduced for a 100 lot subdivision by requiring land worth
$10,000 as they are by a $100 per lot fee.
All courts agree that the extent to which land dedication is re-
quired becomes the standard that cash fee provisions must meet.
Therefore the same Virginia Supreme Court dicta and Attorney
General's opinion that support land dedication would support cash
dedication in event of a state constitutional attack.
43. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Super. 74, _., 230 A.2d
45, 47 (1967); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
44. 27 Conn. Super. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967).
45. Id. at _ 230 A.2d at 47.
46. Id.
47. Associated Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630 (1971); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 .N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, (1966);
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
48. Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 84, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958
(1966). "[Olne arrangement is no more of a 'tax' or 'illegal taking' than the other."Id.
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The tax provisions of the Virginia constitution provide no barrier
to this fee approach.49 An argument that it is a non-uniform tax on
property is met by dicta in subdivision cases that courts view the
issue as not involving the property itself but the use of it." The
Virginia courts rejected a similar constitutional attack in
Pocahantas Consolidated Collieries Co. v. Commonwealth,'
upholding fees on the privilege of deed recordation. 2 The recording
"privilege" and its corresponding fee were directly related. The con-
veying and receiving parties were paying costs for their deeds. That
cost was "specifically and solely attributable" to the property. Like
the Attorney General's opinion on dedication of sites,53 the preced-
ent value of the recording fee case is strongest for cash fees limited
to the effect of the particular subdivision. The non-Virginia deci-
sions holding cash fees in lieu of land to be the equivalent of taxes
have focused hardest on the lack of a direct relationship between the
use of the funds and the subdivision supplying them."
II. COVERAGE OF VIRGINIA ENABLING LEGISLATION
Once the constitutional question is overcome, the scope of exist-
ing enabling legislation should be explored. The state courts that
have struck down mandatory dedication of land or cash for public
sites did so because their state enabling legislation was not adequate
to authorize it."
The dedication approach received consideration in the Virginia
General Assembly as a result of the 1974 Virginia Advisory Legisla-
tive Council (VALC) Report on Land Use Policies." This report was
premised on the existence of adequate legislation "to enable coun-
49. Taxes on property in Virginia must be uniform within the classification. VA. CONST.
art. X, § 1.
50. Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 383, 131 S.E.2d 292 wherein
this phraseology was used to contrast subdivision ordinances with zoning ordinances.
51. 113 Va. 108, 73 S.E. 446 (1912).
52. Id. at 112-13, 73 S.E. at 448.
53. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying test.
54. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Super..74, 230 A.2d 45
(1967); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
55. West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966) (fees per
house for schools); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961) (fees in lieu of land
for parks).
56. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 28.
[Vol. 9:435
DEDICATION OF PUBLIC SITES
ties and municipalities to implement land development control and
planning programs" and the report recommended statutes to re-
quire subdivision control, as opposed to merely authorizing it.17 A
legislative package included with the report would have required
subdivision control, authorized the Division of State Planning and
Community Affairs to set up a model "minimum" subdivision ordi-
nance and promulgated a permit fee system as a substitute for land
dedication.
The 1975 General Assembly agreed with some of the VALC rec-
ommendations when it enacted legislation that revised the empha-
sis of Virginia's land use legislation." Subdivision guidelines that
had formerly been introduced by the permissive "may include" were
rewritten and are now introduced by the directive "shall include."
These rewritten directives contain two clauses that relate to public
facilities other than streets and utilities. One uses a catch-all phrase
after a list of specific public facilities and calls for adequate provi-
sions for "other public purposes."59 The other clause of interest in
this discussion is the requirement for adequate provisions for instal-
lation of public utilities and "other community facilities."6
The shift of emphasis and the effect of revised statutory guide-
lines can be appreciated when viewed against the history of subdivi-
sion law in Virginia. The scope of the permissible regulation within
subdivision statutes has not been tested in the Virginia Supreme
Court. The few cases involving subdivision legislation provide little
insight except to state that subdivision ordinances are part of the
state's police power and that the test for their validity is one of
reasonableness." With no definitive case law, the scope of existing
subdivision enabling legislation must be delineated by reviewing its
legislative evolution and its actual application and governmental
interpretation.
The Virginia legislature passed The Map Act (or Plat Act) in
57. Id. at 29.
58. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 641, at.
59. VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1-466(d) (effective June 1, 1975). This phraseology was not changed
from prior legislation. See id. (Repl. Vol. 1973).
60. Id. § 15.1-466(e) (effective June 1, 1975).
61. See Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 383, 131 S.E.2d 290,
292 (1963).
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1888, 2 to provide for "the sub-division of tracts of land into lots or
parcels."" This first general subdivision law placed major emphasis
on lot sizes, streets and alleys.64 The case law applying the Map Act
was confined to the effect of street dedication and possible vacation
of streets. 5
After World War II, the General Assembly enacted the Virginia
Land Subdivision Act66 to provide for regulating land subdivision
"into lots, streets and alleys and other public areas." 7 The phrase
"other public areas" appears only in the introduction of the Act of
the Assembly. The body of the Act authorized local regulation to
include requirements of adequate open spaces for "traffic, recrea-
tion, light and air."6 6 The provision on recording plats transferred
title to land set aside for "streets, alleys, easements and public
grounds laid out." 9 If plats were vacated prior to subdividing, that
vacation restored title to the landowners for any land set aside for
"public uses."7 The legislature thus used the phrases public areas,
public uses and public grounds interchangeably. Such broad
phrases could cover parks, school sites or other public facilities.
Since they are used in conjunction with the express terms "streets,
alleys, easements," the general terms mean more. At this time sub-
dividers stopped at streets and alleys. 71 They provided these only
because they could not sell a land-locked lot.
62. Va. Acts of Assembly 1887-88, ch. 486, at 553.
63. Id.
64. However the section on recording the plat specifically referred to other site reservation,
providing the plat acted as a fee simple deed "to such portion thereof as is therein dedicated
to charitable, religious or educational purposes." Id. at § 3. This provision never appears
again in Virginia subdivision legislation. It probably owes its presence to the fact that many
early subdivisions were in fact towns in and of themselves, more like Restons than the
common "Block B, Section 3, Shady Acres." In fact some early plats included parks and other
public places. See Oney v. West Buena Vista Land Co., 104 Va. 580, 581, 52 S.E. 343, 344
(1905).
65. See, e.g., Sipe v. Alley, 117 Va. 819, 86 S.E. 122 (1915).
66. Va. Acts of Assembly 1946, ch. 369, at 638.
67. Id.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-781 (Repl. Vol. 1956), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch.
623, at 960.
69. Id. § 15-792.
70. Id. § 15-793.
71. Most subdivision plats recorded in the '40s and '50s in the Richmond metropolitan area
consist of lots, streets and alleys and no more. Toward the end of the '50s subdivision plats
began including utility easements.
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The effect of the 1946 Land Subdivision Act is difficult to deter-
mine because the Virginia Code continued the earlier special legisla-
tion for cities of a certain size, areas adjacent to cities over certain
sizes, etc.72 One of these special acts covered Fairfax County, 73 then
as now one of the fastest growing counties in Virginia. In 1950 that
special' legislation was amended to permit the county to require
"reservation of suitable and adequate sites for schools, parks and
playgrounds." 4 In the early 1960's the Fairfax County Common-
wealth's Attorney asked for an opinion from the Virginia Attorney
General as to the county's power to require the sites to be dedicated
without compensation. The Attorney General stated he had "grave
doubts" that the legislation authorized it. 7 He based his doubt on
three grounds: authorizing a "reservation" did not necessarily imply
"dedication"; dedication might be a taking violative of the Virginia
and United States Constitutions; and a lack of a limitation on the
quantity of land being required and standards for its measurement
might make the dedication unreasonable. 7 He was also concerned
with the lack of any requirement that the county actually use such
land for the purpose of the dedic.ation. However, the Attorney
General stated the well-settled law requiring an owner "to dedi-
cate a reasonable quantity of land for public use as a condition of
subdividing. . . -"I Limitations on land quantities and standards
for its measurement could be built into the local ordinances.
The opinion therefore accepted the concept of dedication. The At-
torney General based his "grave doubts" on the provisions in the
Fairfax special act which provided that recording of the plat trans-
ferred title only for streets, and had not been amended to include
parks or schools. However, the 1946 Virginia Land Subdivision Act
which applied to all counties provided that recording of the plat
72. See, e.g., VA. ComE ANN. § 15-795 (Repl. Vol. 1956), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly
1962, ch. 623, at 960 (special acts for counties adjoining counties of a population in excess of
1,000 per square mile continued).
73. Va. Acts of Assembly 1P46, ch. 379, at 716.
74. Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, ch. 542, at 1145.
75. 1960-61 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 68, 69.
76. Id.
77. Id. This is an early recognition in Virginia of the concept that subdividing is not a right,
but a regulated privilege. The opinion cites no case law on this point. It agrees with the
positions taken in Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31,207 P.2d 1 (1949), and Ridgefield Land
Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928), and is consistent with subsequent Virginia
Supreme Court decisions. See Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380,
131 S.E.2d 290 (1963).
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transferred title to "streets, alleys, easements and public grounds
laid out." 8 His conclusion might have varied under that statute.
In 1956, the State Division of Planning and Economic Develop-
ment published its Suggestions for Regulating Subdivisions79 which
was based on the 1946 Virginia Land Subdivision Act. The report
discussed reservation and outright dedication of school and recrea-
tional sites,'8 and suggested enactment of an ordinance calling for
dedication of streets, drainage areas, parks and playgrounds with-
out reimbursement and for reservation of land for schools, libraries,
municipal buildings and similar public and semi-public uses." Re-
served land would be held for eighteen months following the record-
ing of the plat to permit the governmental body to purchase. The
purchase price would be based on raw land cost, cost of improve-
ments, development costs plus not more than ten per cent profit. If
the sites were not purchased within eighteen months, the land could
be used for subdivision lots. This recommended ordinance served as
a basis for many local subdivision ordinances."
In 1960 the General Assembly realized that the multiplicity of
subdivision laws was confusing for any developer, planner or govern-
ment official, and asked for a study to develop a comprehensive law
uniform throughout the state.83 The VALC subsequently recom-
mended to the 1962 session a single statute to deal uniformly with
counties and municipalities alike. 4 The recommended bill included
provisions for comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and subdivi-
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-793 (Repl. Vol. 1956), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch.
623, at 960. The current phraseology is "streets, alleys, or other public use." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-478 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
79. VIRGINIA DMsION OF PLANNING AND ECONOMIc DEVELoPMENT, SUGGESTIONS FOR REGULAT-
ING SUBDnVISIONS (1956).
80. Id. at 20-21.
81. Id. at 21-22.
82. Loudoun County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 7-4.2 (1957); Similar provisions occur
in later adopted ordinances. Spotsylvania County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 5-32 (1961).
JAMES CITY COUNTY, VA., CODE § 17-44 (1964); PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY, VA., CODE § 17-37
(1964). It is quite common for counties without a separate planning staff to consult the State
Division of Planning and Community Affairs (formerly the Division of Planning and Eco-
nomic Development) for assistance in drafting subdivision ordinances.
83. Va. Acts of Assembly 1960, at 1083, H.D.J. Res. 89. The study was also requested for
zoning and planning laws.
84. H. DEL. Doc. No. 7, 1962 General Assembly, at 6-7. The Council felt that localities
would have sufficient flexibility to handle local problems within their ordinances.
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sion ordinances, and provided the basis for Virginia's present statu-
tory scheme.A5
The provision allowing requirements for open spaces in the pre-
1962 Virginia Land Subdivision Law8 did not appear in the VALC
report or in the legislation. It was replaced by a more general clause
which permitted "adequate provisions for drainage and flood
control and other public purposes."8 This general clause was the
basis for the Attorney General's conclusion in a 1966 opinion88 that
dedication of recreational areas could be required as a condition for
subdividing. 9 Stafford County had proposed reservation of up to
10% of the subdivision total area for parks, playgrounds, schools,
libraries and other public uses. The developer would be reimbursed
except for streets, drainage, parks and playgrounds. If there was no
acquisition within 18 months, the reserved school or library sites
could then be used for lots. The Attorney General summarily said
such requirements were for public purposes and came under the
Code provision.'
In 1972 the General Assembly asked for another review of zoning,
subdivision and land use legislation in Virginia.12 Their charge to
the VALC included a direction to consider protecting the rights of
owners of property and to consider Virginia's needs for land for
parks, open space areas and schools.
85. Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch. 407, at 642.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-781 (RepI. Vol. 1956), repealed by Va. Acts of Assembly 1962, ch.
623 at 960. This legislation allowed stated subdivision regulations to provide "for adequate
open spaces for traffic, recreation, light and air and for a distribution of population and traffic
which will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, convenience and prosperity."
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Once again recordation of the plat trans-
ferred in fee land set aside for streets, alleys, or other public use. Id. § 15.1-478, and vacating
the plat prior to development returned the title to "streets, alleys, easements for public
passage and other public areas." Id. § 15.1-481. The broad "public purpose" and "public
area" phraseology continued.
88. 1966-67 Op. VA. ATr'Y GEN. 272.
89. Id. at 273.
90. These are the same provisions proposed in the basic subdivision ordinance suggested
in 1956 by the State Division of Planning and Economic Development. See text accompany-
ing notes 77-80, supra.
91. 1966-67 Op. VA. ArT'Y GEN. 272, 273. The Attorney General did not cite his 1961 opinion
to Fairfax County. The Stafford County ordinance had a 10% limitation on land 4edication
without reimbursement whereas Fairfax did not. This apparently eased the grave doubts of
constitutionality that the Attorney General had in 1961.
92. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, H. Del. J. Res. 44, at 1633.
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While the study hearings were in process, the Attorney General
issued an opinion stating that a dedication or reservation require-
ment proposed by Powhattan County for up to 10% of the subdivi-
sion's gross area for parks, schools or recreation purposes was valid
under Section 15.1-466 of the Virginia Code.93 The Attorney General
said a set minimum requirement of dedicating at least four acres
would be unreasonable for smaller subdivisions. 4 During this VALC
study period several other counties considered forms of dedication
or reservation requirements. In November 1973, Loudoun County,
a suburban county subject to the Washington, D.C. growth pres-
sures, revised its subdivision ordinance to require a developer to
show on his preliminary plat any schools, parks or other public use
areas shown on the county's comprehensive plan. 5 The planning
commission would then determine whether or not such sites should
be dedicated to, reserved for or acquired by the appropriate govern-
ing body.9
The 1974 VALC Report submitted to the Governor and the Gen-
eral Assembly addressed subdivision legislation in three ways: (1)
recommendation of mandatory subdivision ordinances and compre-
hensive plans; (2) recommendation of a standard statewide mini-
mum subdivision ordinance to be prepared by the Secretary of Com-
merce and Resources and the Division of State Planning and Com-
munity Affairs; and (3) proposed legislation to permit local govern-
ing bodies to collect cash fees for schools and other public buildings
as a condition for subdivision plat approval. 7 The first proposal was
a reaction to the failure of local governments to use the tools the
93. 1973-74 Op. VA. ATr'y GEN. 342. The Attorney General cited his earlier opinion to the
Commonwealth's Attorney of Stafford County, 1966-67 Op. VA. AT'y GEN. 272, and Billings
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone Co., 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964). Billings upheld a 1917
Montana subdivision enabling statute authorizing mandatory dedication of up to one-ninth
of the subdivision area for parks. Id. at _ 394 P.2d at 185.
94. 1973 -74 Op. VA. ATr'y CEN. 342, 343. The Attorney General cited an Illinois case, Rosen
v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960), preceding Pioneer Trust
and Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), and holding similarly
on the requirement of a direct relationship between the land sought and the subdivision's
needs. He used that as an example of one approach, but did not say that was the only
approach.
95. Loudoun County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 9-9-7. The preliminary plat is a basis
for the subdivider and the planning commission to work out the details to be incorporated in
the final plat which is the one that is ultimately recorded. Id. at §§ 9-8, 10-3.
96. Id. at § 4-7-1.
97. 1974 Report, supra note 32.
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legislature had given them and was adopted by the 1975 General
Assembly. 8 The second proposal was to bring in state expertise and
to set up a uniform minimum standard. However, it was not re-
ceived well by local planners and their legislators who preferred to
keep planning closer to home." The third proposal was to "provide
a greater degree of fairness" by providing some standards for cash
and land dedication systems.'"" This legislation was also not
adopted in 1974 and 1975.
The VALC recognized that the public was concerned about un-
controlled conversion of open land to development, but that a "no
growth" stance would not pass federal and state constitutional
limitations on interference with the right of prople to travel and own
and use property. 0' The Council was clearly sympathetic to local
attempts to have "growth" pay its way, but was concerned that
these attempts may be based on inadequate factual studies and the
price sought might be an arbitrary one.0 2
By 1975, many counties had adopted various dedication provi-
sions. Goochland County required dedication of open space for "rec-
reation, light and air" using a variable percentage of the total area
98. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 641, at _.
99. Many local officials tend to view state minimum standards as a surrender of local
autonomy. This is ironic, since many counties have previously sought guidance from state
planners in preparing their ordinances. Of course, this advice can be rejected at will.
100. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 31. As a precondition to adopting a cash fee ordinance,
a locality would have to adopt a comprehensive plan, a capital improvement program and a
subdivision ordinance. The standards were not detailed except the total cash or land outlay
could not exceed 2% of the market value of the developed land. Id.
101. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 11. On the right to travel and its impact on planning,
see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
At the end of the 1974 session, the House of Delegates referred several pending land use
bills to its Committee on Counties, Cities and Towns for study and a report for the 1975
session. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, H.D. Res. 14. The subcommittee's report was submitted
early in the 1975 session. H. Doc. No. 23, 1975 General Assembly. The report was critical of
ordinances on financing public sites that had been enacted by local governing bodies up to
that time. Id. at 5. This criticism reflects the committee's views and does not constitute a
basis for the legislature's intent in the 1975 session. The report described mandatory dedica-
tion as "of questionable constitutional validity." Id. at 7. This conclusion runs contrary to
the overwhelming majority of state decisions, contrary to the two United States Supreme
Court decisions rejecting appeals on federal questions, and contrary to the reported opinions
of the Virginia Attorney General. It also runs contrary to the views of the Division of Planning
and Economic Development, supra note 32, and the 1974 Report, supra note 32.
102. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 14.
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that increased as the individual lot size decreased. 0 3 Hanover
County adopted the same provision presented to the Attorney Gen-
eral by Stafford County in 1966, except it included an optional
provision for cash donation in lieu of land dedication.104 This ordi-
nance limited dedication to open spaces or parks and called only for
reservation with reimbursement for other public areas. Shenandoah
County extended its dedication provision to include land for park-
ing lots, parks, playgrounds, schools and fire stations and land
"for preserving outstanding natural or historic features."' ' The
VALC had proposed a broad package of legislation to clarify these
practices and to make mandatory certain minimum standards.' 6
The legislation adopted in 1975 strengthens the position of coun-
ties adopting mandatory land dedication. 0 It carries forward the
authority to adopt ordinances or regulations for drainage, flood con-
trol and "other public purposes." It also changes other provisions
of the subdivision law in a favorable manner. The regulations for-
merly authorized by the enabling legislation, for grading, graveling
and improving streets and for installing water, sewer and "other
utilities or other facilities"'0 8 are now mandatory, and include "com-
munity facilities" in place of the latter phrase."9 The phrase "com-
munity facilities" is not defined in the Code. However, the new
comprehensive plan section uses "community service facilities" to
include parks, schools, public buildings, hospitals and community
centers."10 Certainly the General Assembly did not call upon the
developer to build schools; the ordinance is to provide for them. By
analogy the ordinance must provide for water, sewer and other pub-
lic utilities. The developer in the past has done this by providing
easements for use by utility departments and the electric and tele-
phone companies. When this new phraseology is combined with the
retained provision for drainage and flood control and "other public
103. Goochland County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 5-35.1.
104. Hanover County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 5-8.
105. Shenandoah County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 4-72.
106. 1974 Report, supra note 32.
107. Va. Acts of Assembly 1975, ch. 641, at
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(e) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
109. Id. § 15.1-466(e) (effective June 1, 1975).
110. Id. § 15.1-446.1. The full list includes parks, forests, schools, playgrounds, public
buildings and institutions, hospitals, community centers, waterworks, sewage disposal or
waste disposal areas, and the like.
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purposes,""' the enabling legislation is complete. The localities are
left to determine the best reasonable way to provide regulations that
carry out these aims. Mandatory dedication of public sites is one
method, the details of which could be accomplished by a site plan. 112
Prior to 1975, the concept of a site plan did not appear in the Vir-
ginia Code. A site plan is now defined as a proposal which includes
all covenants, easements, common open space and public facilities
and other information which is "required by the subdivision ordi-
nance.""13 As the adopted ordinances require dedication of sites,
they can be included in a site plan.
Since subdivision ordinances implement the comprehensive plan
which in turn can include a plan of community service facilities and
since subdivision ordinances must provide for the installation of
community facilities, it is difficult to see how a planning commis-
sion could approve a subdivision plat that violates this comprehen-
sive plan. A logical step is to require public sites to be set aside in
the subdivision process. Reservation of sites has been done in the
past by numerous localities and has been recommended by state
planners since 1956. Dedication of streets, utility easements and
drainage has been premised on state legislation that has never said
a subdivider "must" dedicate them. The addition of community
facilities to that statutory list gives legislative approval of this addi-
tion to a dedication list. This analogy was used by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to uphold mandatory dedication of land or cash for
school, park and recreation needs of the subdivisions.' 4 Wisconsin's
separate enabling legislation for localities experiencing growth pres-
sures had as one of its purposes "to facilitate adequate provisions
for transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, playgrounds.""' 5
The court acknowledged the history of dedicating streets and water
and sewerage easements. The next step was to conclude schools and
parks could be handled the same way since they are listed together
111. Id. § 15.1-466(d).
112. Id. § 15.1-430(o).
113. The VALC had proposed this definition of site plan for "other than a subdivision."
1974 Report, supra note 32, at 59. They would have included such information on the plat of
subdivision. The General Assembly defined the plat of subdivision as a "schematic represen-
tation of land divided or to be divided." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(n) (effective June 1, 1975).
114. Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 4 (1966).
115. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 236.45(1) (1957).
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in the Wisconsin Code."' This is exactly what Section 15.1-466(e)
of the Virginia Code now does. It is bolstered by the broad phraseol-
ogy in Section 15.1-466(d) calling for "adequate provisions for drain-
age and flood control and other public purposes." Virginia's ena-
bling legislation is thus stronger than that of Wisconsin.
Open space or recreation or park dedication in Virginia picks up
added legal support from the conservation article of the new Vir-
ginia Constitution which states the Commonwealth's policy is to
protect its lands from "pollution, impairment, or destruction."11, 7 To
carry out this article, the General Assembly has provided that all
state laws and regulations shall be interpreted in line with this
provision "in recognition of the vital need of the citizens of the
Commonwealth to live in a healthful and pleasant environment.'
18
An argument could well be made that this combination not only
permitted but mandated open space consideration as part of the
subdivision process."' The 1974 VALC Report aptly described the
conservation article in the Virginia Constitution as a response to a
"swelling public outcry" for improved handling of "uncontrolled
conversion of agricultural, forest and other open lands to commer-
cial, industrial and residential development."'' 10 The presence of a
similar conservation article in the California Constitution received
specific favorable consideration when the California Supreme Court
sustained state legislation and local ordinances requiring manda-
tory dedication of parks and recreation areas.1 2'
116. Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, 445 (1965).
117. VA. CONST. art. XI.
118. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-178, -179 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
119. See Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. Rxv. 193, 209, 212
n.79 (1972). There are no court cases interpreting Article XI. The Attorney General has ruled
that this Article requires the State Water Control Board to consider historical aspects on an
application for funds for a sewage retention basin on part of the Kanawha Canal in Richmond.
1971-72 Op. VA. A'r'y GEN. 471. He stated that the Conservation Article lent definition to
reasonable and beneficial uses as set out in the State Water Control Law. By analogy it would
lend definition to "other public purposes" in the subdivision law.
120. 1974 Report, supra note 32, at 9.
121. Associated Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638-639, 484 P.2d 606,
611, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1971). The California provision is stronger than Virginia's, stat-
ing "it is in the best interest of the state to maintain, preserve, conserve and otherwise
continue in existence open space land." CAnt. CONST. art. 28, § 1. However, the California
Supreme Court's decision was broader saying that "the underlying policy" of the Article was
furthered by mandatory dedication of parks and therefore such legislation should be upheld
"whenever possible." Walnut Creek, supra at 638-39, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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Putting up cash fees in lieu of dedicating land is more difficult to
sustain under the current enabling scheme. Although this provision
would place all subdividers on equal footing, where cash fees are
involved a stricter interpretation of the enabling legislation can be
expected if the Virginia Supreme Court follows the reasoning used
in National Realty Corp. v. Virginia Beach,1 22 where the court struck
down a $25 per lot examining fee assessed on Virginia Beach subdi-
vision plats under former Section 15.1-474 of the Virginia Code. The
statute had authorized local governing bodies to administer and
enforce subdivision regulations, but was silent on charging fees for
subdivision review. The court said the lack of an express authoriza-
tion for assessing fees was fatal since municipal powers must be
exercised pursuant to an express grant. The court noted in passing
that the legislature had expressly authorized fees for zoning re-
view."' Subsequent to that decision, the legislature amended the
statute to provide for fees for plat review. 'l
Cash dedication requirements are analogous to assessing costs
for off-site improvements required by new subdivisions. Virginia
subdivision law permits local governing bodies to do this only for
sewerage or drainage facilities;' 25 it does not provide catch-all
phrases, such as "other public purposes" or "other community
facilities." This was a recent addition to the Code 26 because the
General Assembly felt separate legislation was needed for assess-
ing costs for off-site sewers and drainage. It is difficult to see how
off-site schools or fire stations could be covered by the present
limited legislation. When this statutory history is considered with
the National Realty case, it indicates that Virginia's current enab-
ling statute will not be broad enough to sustain cash fee dedica-
tions.'1 Several state supreme courts have held that assessing fees
Accord, Note, Mandatory Dedication of Land by Land Developers, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 41, 55
(1973) (Florida Constitution Conservation Article).
122. 209 Va. 172, 163 S.E.2d 154 (1968).
123. Id. at 176, 163 S.E.2d at 157; see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(f) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(i) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
125. Id. § 15.1-466(i) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
126. Va. Acts of Assembly 1973, ch. 480, at 1027.
127. The concept of cash fee dedications provoked two dissents in the 1974 VALC Report.
1974 Report, supra note 32, at 71-74. John T. Hazel, Jr. objected to land or cash fee dedica-
tions stating it penalized new residents who received the increased development cost when
they purchased homes and that providing the public improvements was a basic obligation of
government, not a burden for the new home purchaser. Id. at 71. Rosser H. Payne, Jr., a
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was in reality and assessment of taxes on subdividers and the power
to tax was not to be inferred from planning legislation.28 Other
courts have held cash dedication provisions to be no different from
any other statutory regulation of land.129 The National Realty case
is more consistent with the former line of cases.
Virginia's statutory scheme now requires local governing bodies to
have reasonable provisions for facilities and other public purposes.
Mandatory dedication of public sites is a method of accomplishing
these objectives. Whether or not the particular provision is reason-
able for a particular locality will vary with the local fact situation.
In a quiet, slowly-developing community, requiring land for a school
site may be quite unrelated to the school board's needs as related
to the particular subdivision. If the locality is rapidly growing, the
new subdivisions will force a need for new schools, and requiring
land dedication would become reasonable. Permissive cash fee pro-
visions'3 ° can provide an escape valve for a developer who would
prefer to keep his land. To require mandatory dedication of cash
fees, specific enabling legislation must be enacted.
IV. SAFEGUARDS FOR DEDICATION STATUTES
There are several safeguards that should be built into an ordi-
nance requiring mandatory dedication of land for public sites. Re-
gardless of what test the Virginia courts adopt for mandatory dedi-
cation of land for public sites, 31 the local government must obtain
factual data to demonstrate the relationship between the public site
planner, had no objection to dedication of land, but objected to asking the developers for
"front end" money for schools, etc. Id. at 73. Cash dedication is not widespread in Virginia,
and does not have any favorable administrative reports or Attorney General opinions to share
its defgnse.
128. Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962); Haugen
v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961). In Coronado the enabling statute included
regulation of "open spaces for. . . recreation, light, and air." The court said it went to actual
land in accordance with the plan but "no further". Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson,
189 Kan. 174, -, 368 P.2d 51, 53 (1962).
129. Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966);
Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 29 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, 449 (1965).
130. See Hanover County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 5-8 (developer has option to
substitute cash for land).
131. See text accompanying note 34, supra.
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sought and the subdivision. A fixed percentage would penalize the
subdivision with large lots. 3' A large percentage factor could drive
costs up so much as to eliminate certain price range homes from the
market. Goochland County's sliding scale based on density has
merit since it recognizes that it is the people living in the subdivi-
sion that create the needs.13
To avoid the concern of developers that land is being required as
a means to discourage subdividing, the county should have a com-
prehensive plan that includes proposed public facilities. It avoids a
contention that the site selection was arbitrary and requires the
county to plan ahead. The planning commission acting as a subdivi-
sion plan reviewing body is in the best position to decide where the
sites should be placed. The comprehnsive plan guides that decision.
It prevents a pepper and salt approach to needs. It also give a
developer some idea of how his subdivision fits into the whole com-
munity.
An argument could be raised that the new resident is being asked
to pay for all improvements through a higher purchase price for his
home, and that the locality is making no effort to meet its basic
governmental obligations. The presence of a budgeted capital im-
provement plan would demonstrate that the county is not attempt-
ing to pass "no growth" off in "responsible growth" clothing.'
132. Compare Planning Board v. Rockland County Builders Ass'n, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial federal
question, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), with Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 374
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
133. Goochland County, Va., Subdivision Ordinance § 5-35.3 (Feb. 5, 1974).
134. Some Virginia localities have adopted "timed development" in their zoning proce-
dures which requires provisions for parks and schools before rezoning is permitted. E.g.,
POWHATAN COUNTY, VA., ZONING CODE art. 35. This would permit land already zoned to escape
financial responsibility. Furthermore at the time.of rezoning, future public needs may be
more speculative than at the time of subdividing since many-tracts are rezoned and then held
for development at a later date. In contrast, few subdividers expend site plan costs without
plans for prompt development. A legal problem arises with this "timed development" ap-
proach. It is essentially a negotiated zoning. This lack of uniformity may be wise planning,
but it is of questionable legality. The only Virginia case, Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va.
209, 1 S.E.2d 296 (1939), did not use the phrases "negotiated zoning" or "contract zoning,"
but its holding casts doubt on the concept. The Alexandria City Council had granted zoning
for a service station conditioned upon certain lighting restrictions. When the service station
later challenged those conditions, they were struck as void because they had not been required
of others in similarly zoned areas. An amendment to the Virginia Code to permit different
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The land to be dedicated should be reflected on the subdivision
plat as well as any site plan. The subdivision plat shows all property
being divided schematically and the public site is part of that divi-
sion. If site plans are required, the public facilities should be shown
in more detail. Such a requirement means the locality will actually
use the property in a manner to meet needs from the subdivision,
not just hold the site for some possible use. The purpose of manda-
tory dedication is not to accumulate public acreage but to answer
community needs generated by subdivision growth.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Growth is here to stay in Virginia. Virginia's growth is best evi-
denced by the expanding subdivisions of single family residences.
The real consumer of land in the current growth is Shady Acres,
sections one, two and three. Virginia must adapt to this growth and
the most economical way is to plan for the future by setting up
standards to control future development.
It is reasonable to have subdivisions bear their share of the growth
burden, and it is advisable to preserve open spaces within them.
Developers and planners accept road construction, water and sewer
contracts, and utility easements as part of the subdivision process.
Open spaces and recreation areas have been required by many local-
ities for a number of years. But growth causes other needs: schools,
fire stations, libraries, and other public buildings. It is consistent to
ask subdivisions to provide for those needs also.
In Virginia, as elsewhere, subdividing has not been looked upon
as a right, but as a privilege. Two Virginia Attorneys General have
so ruled,1 3 and the Virginia Supreme Court has implied such in
dicta.1 31 It has been so treated by planners and local governments.
Consistent with this approach, in 1975, the General Assembly has
served notice that the subdivision process must include certain fea-
tures, including a requirement to provide for "public purposes" and
"community facilities" installation. Local governments do not have
conditions for property rezoned at an owner's request from property already zoned or zoned
at the governing body's request was enacted but only for those counties having the urban
county executive form of government. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
135. See text accompanying notes 28-31, supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 26-27, supra.
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to do that by requiring dedication of land, but it is certainly a
recognized method.
The use of the land or the cash should relate to the subdivision's
needs. The California court's approach 13 7 seems too broad; if the
land or cash is used with no benefit to the subdivision except as a
part of the whole community, then the subdivision is being asked
to support the growth pains of others. This is taxation, not regula-
tion. The Illinois court's approach '38 of "specifically and uniquely
attributable" is too narrow. It is difficult to apply particularly for
small subdivisions. A middle ground is to require the dedicated land
to be related to the given subdivision's growth, but to allow its use
to encompass more than the subdivision's residents.
Virginia's Supreme Court and General Assembly have been strict
on cash payments, whether it be fees for review or costs of off-site
improvements. Certainly no one can quarrel with an option for a
developer to post cash, not land, if he so desires. These voluntary
funds must be earmarked for a precise use, not deposited in the
general fund. There is still a significant legal question as to requir-
ing such cash dedications. The legislature could clear that up since
the question results not from constitutional origin, but from the lack
of adequate enabling legislation.
The purpose of land use legislation is to promote the safety,
health and welfare of the community. We have come 200 years from
the time when a man built a town by building first his house, then
one for his brother and so on. We demand schools for our children,
parks for our leisure, police and fire departments for our safety and
a myriad of services for our welfare. Booming bedroom communities
demand more facilities while consuming the space needed for what
they demand. Responsible growth means orderly planning for our
land uses and our service needs and spreading that cost among the
responsible parties. Shady Acres must contribute its share.
137. See Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Associated Home Builders
v. Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
138. Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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